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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case arises from a slip and fall incident in a 
bathtub aboard the M/V Sovereign, a vessel operated by defendants 
Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd. and Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 
et al. ("Royal Caribbean").  The district court granted Royal 
Caribbean's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff 
Elizabeth Fedorczyk did not provide any evidence to support her 
claim that Royal Caribbean's failure to provide adequate abrasive 
strips in its bathtub was the proximate cause of her injuries. 
Because we agree with the district court that the evidence 
presented does not create a material issue of fact as to 
causation, which is an essential element of the tort of 
negligence, we will affirm the June 26, 1995 order of the 
district court.   
 
 I. 
 The following facts are not disputed.  Fedorczyk sailed 
from Miami aboard the Sovereign, a cruise ship operated by Royal 
Caribbean.  While on board she went to the pool area, applied 
sunscreen to her body, sunned herself, and swam in the pool. 
After approximately two hours Fedorczyk returned to her cabin to 
take a shower.  She turned on the water, stepped into the middle 
of the bathtub and started to soap herself, at which time she 
slipped and fell onto the floor of the tub. 
 The tub in her cabin was about five and one-half feet 
long and two-feet, four-inches wide.  It had four anti-skid 
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strips, each running from the middle to the back of the tub. 
Fedorczyk has no recollection whether her feet were on or off the 
abrasive strips at the time of her fall.  The tub was also 
equipped with a grab rail which Fedorczyk made a failed attempt 
to reach when she fell.  After the accident she returned to the 
bathtub to ascertain the cause of the accident.  She re-entered 
the tub and discovered that there was sufficient space between 
the abrasive strips so that her feet could just fit in between 
them.  However, she does not know where her feet were at the time 
of the accident. 
 Fedorczyk's expert, an architect, testified that at the 
time he examined the bathtub, there were seven as opposed to four 
abrasive strips.  Even with the seven abrasive strips, according 
to the expert, Royal Caribbean failed to provide a sufficiently 
large area of non-slip surface to permit its safe use.  He based 
his finding on the fact that the tub failed to comply with the 
Consumer Products Safety Commission's standard for slip-resistent 
bathing facilities.  This standard specifies that for any surface 
that is textured or treated with appliques, the pattern shall be 
such that a one and one-half by three inch rectangular template 
placed anywhere thereon shall cover some textured or treated 
area.     
 The expert also testified that beyond certain safety 
measures, there is no definite way of preventing slips 
altogether, and that falls can happen under any circumstances. He 
stated that the presence of bath oils and soap are large 
variables that can skew the correlation between the amount of 
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textured surface area and safety.  He concluded that Royal 
Caribbean deviated from an acceptable standard of care in failing 
adequately to treat or texturize the tub, and that the spacing 




 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§1291.  "When reviewing an order granting summary judgment we 
exercise plenary review and apply the same test the district 
court should have applied."  Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 
768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994).  "Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c), that test is whether there is a genuine issue of material 
fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law."  Id. (quoting Gray v. York 
Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992).  "In so 
deciding, the court must view the facts in a light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that 
party's favor.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)."  Id. (quoting Gray, 957 
F.2d at 1078.) 
III. 
A.   
 We first consider which substantive law applies. 
Fedorczyk's negligence cause of action, for the purposes of this 
matter, could have been brought under either admiralty or 
diversity jurisdiction.   Substantive maritime law applies to a 
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cause of action brought in admiralty.  East River S.S. Corp. v. 
TransAmerica DeLeval, Inc., 476 U.S 858, 864, 106 S. Ct. 2295, 
2298 (1986).  If brought under diversity of citizenship, the 
forum state's choice of law rules dictate which state law 
applies.  Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 
S. Ct. 1020 (1941).  Admiralty jurisdiction apparently exists 
since the injury occurred on navigable waters, Foremost Ins. Co. 
v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 673, 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2657 (1982), 
and the incident has a nexus to "traditional maritime activity." 
Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S. Ct. 2892 (1990); Executive 
Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 409 U.S. 249, 253-
254 (1972).  A plaintiff with a claim cognizable in the district 
court's admiralty jurisdiction and actionable on other 
jurisdictional grounds may invoke whichever jurisdiction desired. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h).  To invoke admiralty jurisdiction, however, 
a plaintiff must affirmatively insert a statement in the 
pleadings identifying the claim as an "admiralty or maritime 
claim."  Id.; Bodden v. Osgood, 879 F.2d 184, 186 (5th Cir. 
1989).   
 Fedorczyk neither pled nor otherwise invoked the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the district court in the proceedings 
below.  She filed her original complaint in state court, alleging 
causes of action under negligence and breach of implied and 
express warranties.  Royal Caribbean removed the case to federal 
district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  The 
complaint was not amended to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.  The 
district court entered a pretrial order without objection from 
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the parties stating that the jurisdictional predicate was 
diversity of citizenship.  It subsequently dismissed the case on 
summary judgment due to Fedorczyk's failure to prove that the 
defendants' negligence was the proximate cause of her injury. The 
plaintiff is the master of her complaint, and she never invoked 
admiralty jurisdiction.  Indeed, the parties agreed at oral 
argument they are satisfied with the application of New Jersey 




 For Fedorczyk to prevail on her negligence claim, in 
addition to proving that Royal Caribbean was negligent, she must 
also prove that the Royal Caribbean's negligence caused her 
injury.  Kulas v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 196 A.2d 769, 
772 (N.J. 1964).  Causation includes cause in fact and legal 
causation, which is often referred to as proximate cause.  Courts 
have often conflated cause in fact and legal causation into 
"proximate cause," but the two are conceptually distinct.  W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 
(5th ed. 1984) ("PROSSER") ("There is perhaps nothing in the 
entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement . . 
. [and] confusion.").   
 Causation in fact depends on whether an act or omission 
played a material part in bringing about an event.  An act or 
omission is not regarded as a cause in fact of an event if the 
particular event would have occurred without it.  PROSSER, supra, 
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§ 41 at 265; Kulas, 196 A.2d at 772.  When more than one act or 
omission could have caused an event, then the negligent conduct 
must be shown to have been a substantial factor in causing the 
harm.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965).  See HARPER & 
JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 20.2, at 1110, 1114 n.18 (1956).  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court has adopted these principles.  State of New 
Jersey, Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Central Power & 
Light Co., 351 A.2d 337, 342 (N.J. 1976); Kulas, 196 A.2d at 769. 
 On the issue of causation, as on any other essential 
element of the tort of negligence, the plaintiff has the burden 
of proof.   Long v. Landy, 171 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1961); Hansen v. 
Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 84 A.2d 281, 284 (N.J. 1951); PROSSER, 
supra, § 41, at 269.  It is axiomatic that "the mere showing of 
an accident causing injuries is not sufficient from which to 
infer negligence.  Negligence is a fact which must be proved; it 
will not be presumed."  Hansen, 84 A.2d at 284.  The plaintiff 
must introduce evidence which provides a reasonable basis for the 
conclusion that it was more likely than not that the negligent 
conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the injury. 
PROSSER, supra, § 41, at 269.   
 The core problem for Fedorczyk is she is unable to 
prove that the negligence of Royal Caribbean in fact caused her 
injury. Fedorczyk's expert testified that a person may fall in a 
bathtub under ordinary circumstances and the presence of bath oil 
and soap are "great variables" that could have caused the fall. 
Fedorczyk could have fallen in the bathtub for reasons other than 
Royal Caribbean's negligence.  Therefore, Fedorczyk must show 
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that Royal Caribbean's negligence was a substantial factor in 
causing her injury.  Fedorczyk concedes that if she had been 
standing on any of the four abrasive strips at the time of the 
accident, she could not establish Royal Caribbean's failure to 
provide adequate stripping was the cause of her injuries. 
 Fedorczyk has not provided any direct evidence that the 
lack of abrasive surface in the bathtub caused her accident. 
Instead, Fedorczyk relies solely upon what she asserts is 
circumstantial proof of causation.  Circumstantial evidence when 
used to reason deductively in civil cases is defined as "a 
preponderance of probabilities according to the common experience 
of mankind."  Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 139 A.2d 
404, 411 (N.J. 1958); Hansen, 84 A.2d at 284.  The circumstances 
must be strong enough "that a jury might properly, on the grounds 
of probability rather than certainty, exclude the inferences 
favorable to the defendant."  Jackson v. Delaware, L.& W. R.R. 
Co., 170 A. 22, 24 (N.J. 1933).  See Hansen, 84 A.2d at 284 ("the 
evidence must be such as to justify an inference of probability 
as distinguished from . . . mere possibility") (citing Callahan 
v. National Lead Co., 72 A.2d 187, 189 (N.J. 1950)); see also 
Kulas, 196 A.2d at 773 ("[Causation] may rest upon legitimate 
inference, so long as the proof will justify a . . . logical 
inference as distinguished from mere speculation.") (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted); Kahalili v. Rosecliff 
Realty, 141 A.2d 301, 307 (N.J. 1958) ("'Reasonable probability' 
is the standard of persuasion");  PROSSER, supra, § 41, at 269.  
 Circumstantial evidence when used to prove negligence 
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must be distinguished from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur combines circumstantial evidence 
with a presumption on the burden of proof.  It states that in 
certain cases the circumstantial evidence is sufficient for 
negligence to be presumed, and the burden of proof shifts to the 
defendant to rebut some element of the case.  Res ipsa loquitur 
is "grounded in the sound procedural policy of placing the duty 
of producing evidence on the party who has superior knowledge or 
opportunity" to explain the causative circumstances. Id.  The 
doctrine is applicable when: (1) the occurrence itself ordinarily 
bespeaks negligence; (2) the instrumentality was within the 
defendant's exclusive control; and (3) there is no indication 
that the injury was the result of the plaintiff's own voluntary 
act or neglect.  Buckelew v. Grossbard, 435 A.2d 1150, 1157 (N.J. 
1981) (citing Bornstein, 139 A.2d at 469).  Here, Fedorczyk 
concedes that res ipsa loquitur does not apply.  We agree.  The 
injury resulting from falling in a bathtub does not bespeak 
negligence, nor was the cause of the injury something which 
necessarily lay within the Royal Caribbean's exclusive control.  
Thus Fedorczyk may not rely on the mere happening of the accident 
as prima facie proof of causation in fact. 
 Fedorczyk may still prove negligence through 
circumstantial evidence, even though the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply.  Menth v. Breeze Corp, 73 A.2d 183, 187 
(N.J. 1950).  Fedorczyk presents the following circumstantial 
evidence.  After the accident, she discovered that her feet could 
fit between the strips.  Fedorczyk also testified that she was in 
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the middle of the tub at the time of the accident.  Finally, her 
expert opined that based on his inspection of the tub and the 
evidence in the record, Royal Caribbean's failure to adequately 
strip the tub caused Fedorczyk's injuries.  
 Even though we must draw all legitimate inferences in 
Fedorczyk's favor, the inference that she was standing between 
the strips at the time of the accident, because her feet could 
fit between the strips, is not an appropriate inference to be 
drawn.  The possibility of the existence of an event does not 
tend to prove its probability.  See Dombrowska v. Kresge-Newark, 
Inc., 183 A.2d 111 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1962) (evidence that 
worn wheel could cause accident insufficient to take to a jury 
the issue of whether an injury was likely to have been caused by 
wheel malfunction); see also Dziedzic v. St. John's Cleaners and 
Shirt Launderers Inc., 249 A.2d 382 (N.J. 1969) (since no 
evidence introduced on the issue of how plaintiff's positioning 
in a truck increased her injury in resulting from an automobile 
accident, jury could only speculate as to whether plaintiff's 
contributory negligence caused her injuries).   
 The testimony that Fedorczyk was standing in the middle 
of the tub also says nothing about whether it was more probable 
than not that she was standing between the strips when she fell. 
The four strips were placed parallel to the long dimension of the 
tub, running one and one-half feet from the back end of the tub 
to the middle.  Standing in the middle of the tub does not 
provide any relevant information on whether she was standing on 
or between the strips. 
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 Finally, the expert's conclusion that the failure to 
adequately strip the tub caused Fedorczyk's accident was not 
legally admissible.  An expert opinion is not admissible if the 
court concludes that an opinion based upon particular facts 
cannot be grounded upon those facts.  1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 13, 
at 56 (John William Strong, ed. 1992).  In order for an expert 
opinion to be admissible, the technique the expert employs in 
formulating an opinion must be reliable.  In re Paoli R.R. Yard 
PCB Lit., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, sub 
nom., General Elec. Co. v. Ingram, 115 S. Ct. 1253 (1995).  In 
contrast, if an expert opinion is based on speculation or 
conjecture, it may be stricken.  1 MCCORMICK, supra, § 13, at 56 
n.15.   
 Fedorczyk's expert testified that if there had been 
more stripping, it would be more likely that she would not have 
fallen.  He went on to conclude that the absence of strips caused 
her to fall.  We agree that the more stripping there is in the 
tub, the less likely it is a person would fall because of 
inadequate stripping.  However, the expert's opinion that 
inadequate stripping caused Fedorczyk's injuries is not based on 
any direct or circumstantial evidence of where she was standing 
when she fell.  It is speculative to conclude that the inadequate 
stripping caused Fedorczyk's injuries when no evidence in the 
record indicates where Fedorczyk was standing in the tub.  It is 
also speculative to infer that Fedorczyk was standing between the 
strips at the time of the accident solely from the fact that she 
fell.  Because the expert's conclusion is based on pure 
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speculation, rather than a reasonable inference, it is without 
foundation and is inadmissable.    
 A portion of the bathtub had nonskid stripping and a 
portion of it did not have the stripping.  No evidence presented 
tends to prove Fedorczyk was standing either on or off the 
stripping at the time she fell.  Without such evidence, the jury 
is left to speculate whether Royal Cruise's negligence was the 
cause in fact of her injury.  "A mere possibility of causation is 
not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation 
or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, 
it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the 
defendant."  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B (1965).   
   A hypothetical illustrates the point.  A company 
provides a stairway in which some of the stairs are defective and 
some are in fine condition.  A person falls on the steps, but 
does not know which step she fell on.  No evidence is introduced 
that tends to prove she stepped on the defective step.  The 
injured party simply testified that she walked down the steps and 
fell.  We may not reasonably infer that the defective steps 
probably caused her injury merely because she may have stepped on 
a defective stair.  Without evidence establishing a likelihood 
that the injured party stepped on the defective stair, a jury 
would be left to speculate as to the cause of the injury.  Simply 
put, increased risk of harm due to a defendant's negligence, 
standing alone, does not permit an inference that an injury, more 




 Fedorczyk has failed to provide any direct or 
circumstantial evidence of how Royal Caribbean's admitted failure 
to adequately strip the bathtub caused her injury.  Without 
providing any evidence tending to show where Fedorczyk was 
standing when she fell, she is unable to create a material issue 
of fact regarding causation.  Based on the evidence presented, a 
jury could only speculate whether Fedorczyk's injuries were 
caused by the inadequate stripping.  We will affirm the order of 






FEDORCZYCK v. CARRIBEAN CRUISE LINES, LTD., 




STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
 Because I conclude that Fedorczyck has produced 
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer 
causation, I would reverse and remand for trial.
 
 Comment b to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B 
(1965) is directly on point: 
The fact of causation is incapable of 
mathematical proof, since no man can say with 
absolute certainty what would have occurred 
if the defendant had acted otherwise.  If, as 
a matter of ordinary experience, a particular 
act or omission might be expected to produce 
a particular result, and if that result has 
in fact followed, the conclusion may be 
justified that the causal relationship 
exists.  In drawing that conclusion, the 
triers of fact are permitted to draw upon 
ordinary human experience as to the 
probabilities of the case. 
Illustration 3, which provides an example of the application of 
this principle, is similar to the present case: 
The A Railroad Company fails to use 
reasonable care to light a steep and winding 
stairway leading from its waiting room to the 
train platform.  B, an elderly and corpulent 
woman, is in the room waiting for a train. 
The attendant calls out the train.  B hurries 
down the steps, and misses her footing in the 
dusk on the unlighted stair, falls, and is 
injured.  On the basis of common experience 
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that absence of light increases the 
likelihood of such a fall, and that people do 
not ordinarily fall on properly lighted 
stairs, it may be found that the absence of 
light was a substantial factor in causing the 
fall. 
Id.  More specifically, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts  
§ 41 (5th ed. 1984) explains that a conclusion of causation is 
permissible where "the injury which has in fact occurred is 
precisely the sort of thing that proper care on the part of the 
defendant would be intended to prevent."  Id. at 270. 
 I would resolve this appeal using these basic 
principles.  Fedrorczyck's expert testified that the bathtub was 
too slippery to be reasonably safe because it had insufficient 
abrasive strips.  Fedorczyck was standing in the bathtub and she 
fell.  Her fall is precisely the type of injury that adequate 
abrasive strips were designed to prevent.  Moreover, one could 
conclude based on everday experience that while falls do occur in 
bathtubs that are not too slippery, they are not routine. 
Accordingly, a reasonable jury could infer that Fedorczyk's fall 
was caused by the unsafe condition of the tub.  While I agree 
with the court that Fedorczyck cannot invoke res ipsa loquitur, 
"[a] res ipsa loquitur case is . . . merely one kind of case of 
circumstantial evidence, in which the jury may reasonably infer   
. . . causation from the mere occurrence of the event and the 
defendant's relation to it."  Restatement (Second) of Torts  
§ 328D cmt. b (emphasis added). 
  
 
 
